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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16786 
DANNY BRENT CRISCOLA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of Unlawful Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance for Value, a violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, § 58-37-B(l)A (1975), as amended, a felony 
of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, pre-
siding, on October 3 and 4, 1979, and sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of O to 5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks af f irmance of Appellant's conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 6, 1978, at approximately 7:00 a.m., 
Appellant phoned Robert Pow~rs, a special agent for the 
Arizona Drug Control District, and Steve Brown, an under-
cover agent for the State Narcotics and Liquor Law 
Enforcement Division, Utah Department of Public Safety, 
(T.25) to invite them to meet him at his residence to further 
negotiate a drug deal that had been discussed the previous 
evening. (T.26). Powers and Brown had met Appellant and 
his brother on the evening of Aprit 5th when the agents 
accompanied them to a private club (T.51). At the club, 
Appellant introduced Powers and Brown to a couple of pilots 
who Appellant stated were "flying loads of marijuana." 
Appellant asked to. see Powers identification because he 
wanted to make sure Powers was from Arizona as he had claimed 
(T.51). Later that evening, a drug transaction between 
Agent Powers anq Appellants brother, Bobby Criscola, occurred. 
Agent Brown testified at trial that prior to the transaction 
taking place, Bobby looked at Appellant, who appeared to 
accept the terms of the deal by nodding his head (T.79). 
Appellant disputed this testimony at trial (T.90). 
Upon arriving at Appellant's brother's house, 
Powers and Brown met Appellant, his brother, and a woman 
identified as Frankie(T.27). A conversation took place 
-2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
regarding a quarter ounce of cocaine (T.27). Agent Powers 
asked Appellant if the cocaine were "still available" and 
how much it would cost. Appellant told Powers that the 
price would be around $600. Agents Powers and Brown sub-
sequently accompanied Appellant, his brother, Frankie, and 
an unidentified man to a cafe where the discussion concerning 
drugs continued (T.30). Prior to this time, Appellant 
instructed Powers not to deal with his brother, Bobby 
Criscola, but to deal directly with Appellant (T.42,52,97). 
At the trial, Agent Powers testified that Appellant 
asked Brown if he were interested in a "girl, 11 a slang term 
for cocaine (T.30,60). Brown said that he was and asked if 
it were still available. The group left the cafe and 
Appellant's brother told the agents to call them around 
2:30 or 3:00 that afternoon (T.32). Powers called Appellant 
at the agreed upon time and Appellant asked him if he were 
still interested in the cocaine. Powers replied that he was 
and Appellant told him to come to his brother's house. Powers 
and Brown drove over to Bobby Criscola's house and Appellant 
met them between the house and street (T.33). Appellant 
informed them that they would have to make a "run" to pick 
up the cocaine (T.33) and the three of them, Agents Powers 
and Brown and Appellant left in Agent Brown's car (T.34) · 
Appellant repeatedly asked Brown and Powers if they were 
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police officers (T.35,63) and they stated that they were 
not. Appellant directed them to stop the car at approximately 
1700 South and 1300 East. Appellant asked for the agreed 
upon $600 and the agents told him they would give him $300 
up front and the remaining $300 when they got the cocaine. 
Brown counted the $600.00 in front of Appellant and placed 
the money on the console between the two front seats of the 
car. (T.36). Appellant then told the agents it would not be 
necessary to give him any money until they received the 
cocaine (T.64). Appellant left the vehicle and returned a 
few minutes later (T.36). Appellant again asked Powers and 
Brown if they were police officers and again they said they 
were not. Appellant then handed Agent Brown a plastic bag 
containing the cocaine (T.37) and Powers gave Appellant the 
money (T.37). 
There was a discussion regarding the possibility 
of future negotiations between Appellant and the agents (T.38). 
Appellant stated that he was reluctant to talk about cocaine 
on the telephone and wanted to set up a code (T.38,67). 
Appellant told Powers that if he were interested in buying 
ounces of cocaine, he should mention "ski boots;" if he were 
interested in buying half-pounds of cocaine, he should mention 
"ski poles;" and if he were interested in buying pounds of 
cocaine, he should talk about "skis" (T. 38) . 
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Appellant once again expressed concern that Powers 
and Brown were police officers, but told them that "if [they] 
played [their] cards right, [they] could flood the Phoenix 
market with good cocaine from Salt Lake" (T.39,53). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE APPLICABLE THEORY OF 
ENTRAPMENT. 
Appellant argues that the trial court's refusal 
to submit his jury instruction on the subjective theory 
of entrapment constituted error and violated his right to 
due process of law. Appellant further argues that the 
court retroactively applied the objective test for entrapment 
adopted by this Court in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1979) an action prohibited as an expost facto law. Respondent 
submits that there was no ex post facto application of a 
criminal statute, that appellant did not preserve his claim 
for appeal in that at trial he argued an opposing theory, and 
finally that the trial court's instructions to the jury 
presented the appropriate theory of entrapment. 
The constitutional prohibition against any ex 
post facto application of a criminal statute is not at issue 
iri this case. Appellant argues, however, that although 
the trial court did not retroactively apply a new criminal 
statute, not in effect at the time the crime was committed, 
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the court allegedly accomplished the same thing by applying 
a new statutory construction of a previously enacted statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1953) as amended. Appellant .cites 
the case of Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), in 
support of this argument. Respondent contends that Appellant's 
reliance on Bouie is misplaced. Bouie involved two defendants 
who were charged with criminal trespass in violation of a 
local statute which prohibited entry onto premises of another 
after receiving notice not to enter. Their convictions 
were affirmed by the State Supreme Court and they petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court for review by certiorari. 
The petitioners claimed that the State Supreme Court's 
new construction of the statute to cover not only the act 
of entry onto premises of another after receiving notice not 
to enter, but also the act of remaining after receiving 
notice to leave, in effect punished them for conduct that 
was not criminal at the time they committed it, and thus 
violated the requirement of the due process clause that a 
criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct which 
it prohibits. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Bouie 
that the action of the State Supreme Court, in giving 
retroactive application to its new construction of the 
statute, deprived petitioners of their right to fair warning 
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of a criminal prohibition, and thus violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bouie, the Court 
was dealing with retroactive application of new statutory 
construction of a substantive criminal statute, the effect of 
which was to make an act that was not criminal at the the 
time it was committed, a crime. That is not the situation 
here. In this case, Appellant was convicted for the crime ·of 
Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value. 
The criminal conduct and the requirement that one have 
fair warning of specifically which conduct is prohibited 
is not an issue here. What is at issue is the statutory 
defense of entrapment and the court's use of the applicable 
law in instructing the jury. Appellant was not deprived of 
notice of prohibited acts; the due process rights of Appellant, 
with which the Court in Bouie was concerned, have not been 
violated. Thus, there is no ex post facto situation in 
the present case. 
Secondly, Appellant's claim that the court's 
instruction to the jury was improper because it embodied the 
objective test for entrapment adopted by this court in 
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), is diametrically 
opposed to the theory or objection he posed at trial. counsel 
for Appellant, at trial, objected to the court's Instruction 
No. 18 because "it appears to concentrate on a subjective 
-7-
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standard that is concentrating on the victim of potential 
entrapment rather than the activities of the persons - the 
agents of the state who are in fact engaging in that conduct." 
(T.145) In other words, Appellant's counsel at trial objected 
to the court's instruction because it set forth the subjective 
test for entrapment; yet on appeal, counsel for Appellant 
now chooses to argue that the court erred in failing to 
instruct on the subjective theory of entrapment. It appears 
that Appellant on appeal now wants what he voiced objection 
to at trial. 
Finally, respondent submits it was totally proper 
for the trial court to instruct the jury on the objective 
theory of entrapment and indeed, it would have been error 
for the court to do otherwise since the trial occurred after 
this Court issued its ruling in State v. Taylor, supra, 
which required a jury instruction on the objective theory 
of entrapment. Since the Taylor ruling focuses on a defense 
which is raised procedurally at trial, and is not a decision 
which changed the element of a crime as in Bouie, supra, 
respondent submits that the critical date for implementation 
of the new ruling is not when the crime was committed, but 
rather when the appellant's case went to trial. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL SUP-
PORTS APPELLANT'S CONVICTION UNDER 
EITHER THE SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE 
THEORY OF ENTRAPMENT. 
In the case of State v. Taylor, supra, this court 
stated that the subjective theory of entrapment focused on 
whether the particular defendant was predisposed to commit 
the crime or was an otherwise innocent person who would not 
have erred, except for the persuasion of the government's 
agents. Whereas, the objective theory of entrapment adopted 
by this Court in Taylor focuses on whether the police conduct 
revealed in the particular case falls below standards for 
the "proper use of governmental power." Id. at 500. 
The facts of this case cannot support a defense 
of entrapment under either the subjective theory or the 
objective theory. Under the subjective theory, the conduct 
of Appellant, shows that it was he who contacted agents 
after the initial meeting; it was Appellant who determined 
the price of the cocaine; it was Appellant who directed the 
agents to the place where he picked up the cocaine, sold it 
to the agents, and received the money. Further, it was 
Appellant who continuously and repeatedly asked the agents 
if they were police officers - surely not the actions of an 
"otherwise innocent person" who would not commit the crime 
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except for the persuasion of the government's agents. 
Had Appellant had no predisposition to commit the crime, 
he could have chosen not to contact the agents to resume 
negotiations for the drug sale. Appellant claims he did 
all of this, however, because he wanted to protect his 
little brother. Yet, no threats were made to Appellant 
or his little brother, and although Appellant claims he 
was afraid to refuse to sell the agents drugs, he never 
told them he would not sell them drugs, even to see their 
reaction. 
Under the objective theory of entrapment, the 
conduct of the agents involved must be carefully scrutinized. 
The transcript reveals that the conduct of the agents involv~1 
cannot be criticized. There were no threats made by the 1 
agents to either Appellant or his little brother. Further, 
no coercive tactics were employed to entice Appellant into 
committing the crime. The agents merely provided Appellant 
with an opportunity to carry out his criminal intention. 
Once again, it was not the agents who made subsequent contact 1 
with Appellant, but rather it was Appellant who remained in 
contact with the agents. See State v. Summers, 569 P. 2d· 1110 
(Utah 1977) and State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975). 
The facts clearly establish that the Appellant was 
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not entrapped into committing the crime for which he was 
convicted; rather he was merely appr~hended. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and case law, 
Respondent. urges this Court to affirm Appellant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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